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Presenta(on	  Overview	  
•  Introduc(on	  
•  Overview	  of	  low-­‐cost	  level	  crossing	  research	  and	  strategy	  
•  Case	  study	  of	  2	  top-­‐level	  system	  hazards	  from	  safety	  argument	  
–  Limita(ons	  /	  flaws	  of	  assump(ons	  made	  	  
•  At	  interfaces	  	  
•  Regarding	  interac(ons	  with	  actors	  (systems	  /	  people)	  outside	  system	  boundary	  
–  Human	  factors	  analysis	  within	  the	  context	  of	  quan(ta(ve	  risk	  assessment	  
•  Key	  human	  factors	  considera(ons	  from	  case	  study	  
•  Conclusions	  
•  Future	  of	  Rail	  CRC	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Introduc(on	  
•  Our	  experience	  from	  development	  of	  Low-­‐cost	  level	  crossing	  safety	  
argument	  
–  Need	  for	  beYer	  integra(on	  of	  HF	  and	  engineering	  during	  all	  lifecycle	  phases,	  not	  
only	  in	  later	  phases	  
•  Bridge	  the	  disconnect	  between	  engineering	  and	  human	  factors	  
–  Requirements	  and	  design	  should	  be	  op(mized	  with	  systems	  view	  of	  safety	  in	  mind	  
•  All	  systems	  interface	  with	  humans	  
•  BeYer	  to	  op(mize	  systems	  for	  humans,	  rather	  than	  adapt	  humans	  to	  work	  with	  systems…	  
–  A	  good	  case	  study	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"Humans	  shall	  be	  considered	  as	  possessing	  the	  
ability	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  RAMS	  of	  a	  railway	  
system.	  To	  achieve	  this	  aim,	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  
human	  factors	  can	  influence	  railway	  RAMS	  should	  
be	  idenDfied	  and	  managed	  throughout	  the	  enDre	  
lifecycle.	  The	  analysis	  should	  include	  the	  potenDal	  
impact	  of	  human	  factors	  of	  railway	  RAMS	  within	  




“17—Human	  factors	  	  
Procedures	  to	  ensure	  that	  human	  factor	  
maIers	  are	  taken	  into	  account	  during	  the	  
development,	  operaDon	  and	  maintenance	  of	  
the	  safety	  management	  system	  and	  for	  the	  
integraDon	  of	  human	  factors	  principles	  and	  
knowledge	  into	  all	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  
operaDonal	  and	  business	  systems.”	  	  
	  
Rail	  Safety	  Na4onal	  Law	  Regula4ons	  	  
How	  do	  we	  opera1onalize	  this??	  
Rail	  CRC	  Na(onal	  Low-­‐cost	  Level	  Crossing	  
Trial	  Programme	  &	  Risk	  and	  Legal	  
Evalua(on	  Project	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•  Located on North Coast Line 
•  Narrow gauge, bi-directional track 
•  25KV AC overhead power 
•  Preceding cutting and curve 
•  60 km/h [70km/h Tilt-train] 
•  Freight & passenger traffic 
•  Located on North Coast Line 
•  Standard gauge, bi-directional track 
•  115km/h freight [125km/h passenger] 
•  Freight & passenger traffic 
•  Located on Geelong-Ballarat freight 
corridor 
•  Broad gauge, bi-directional track 
•  Low-frequency freight traffic 
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Case	  Study	  –	  Low	  Cost	  Level	  Crossings	  
TSV	  Seminar	  Series	  -­‐	  HF	  in	  Transport	  Safety	  06/02/2014	   7	  
Industry standards 
body / ALCAM 
committee
Project R2.121 - Low Cost Railway Level Crossing Risk and Legal Evaluation
Project R3.122 - Affordable Railway Level Crossings
Development of nationally 
consistent system definition 
and requirement 
specification
National Low Cost Level Crossing Trial 
Programme
Development of a safety argument 
supporting low-cost level crossings with 



















Safety	  Argument	  Suppor(ng	  Adop(on	  of	  
LCLCWDs	  
	  
•  Assessment	  of	  LCLCWD	  Risk	  
•  Safety	  Requirements	  
–  Tolerable	  Hazard	  Rates	  
(THRs)	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Safety integrity, safety 
requirements, rules, etc. 




–  Hazard	  1:	  Level	  crossing	  warning	  device	  does	  not	  provide	  
adequate	  warning	  to	  road	  users	  of	  a	  rail	  vehicle	  approaching	  
or	  traversing	  the	  level	  crossing	  
•  LCLCWD	  wrong-­‐side	  failure	  
•  Quan(fica(on	  of	  risk	  
–  Collision	  likelihood	  model	  with	  event	  tree	  model	  to	  quan(fy	  risk	  due	  to	  failure	  
–  In	  risk	  model	  assump(on	  that	  wrong-­‐side	  failure	  does	  not	  persist	  beyond	  
traversal	  of	  1	  train	  
•  Treatment	  of	  uncertainty	  
–  Sensi(vity	  analysis	  
•  Assump(ons	  around	  persistence	  of	  failure,	  addi(onal	  sensi(vity	  
analysis	  for	  range	  of	  procedures	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HAZARD1	  and	  Detec(on	  of	  Failure	  
–  Wrong-­‐side	  failure	  
–  Driver	  becomes	  aware	  of	  failure	  
•  Observa(on	  of	  RX5	  side	  lights,	  in	  some	  jurisdic(ons	  healthy	  state	  
indica(on	  
–  Probability	  of	  train	  driver	  no(cing	  
–  Controller	  becomes	  aware	  failure	  
•  Correla(on	  of	  reported	  train	  movements	  vs.	  expected	  train	  
movements	  
–  Frequency	  of	  data	  analysis	  
•  Human	  Procedures	  between	  detec(on	  of	  failure	  and	  
protec(on	  of	  level	  crossing	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HAZARD1	  and	  Persistence	  of	  Failure	  
•  Procedures:	  what	  should	  happen	  in	  theory…	  (rules	  according	  to	  dral	  ANRP)	  
–  If	  ac(ve	  LX	  is	  faulty	  or	  poten(ally	  faulty,	  network	  control	  officers	  must	  warn	  rail	  
traffic	  crews	  
•  Communica(ons	  typically	  occur	  via	  radio	  
–  Rail	  traffic	  crew	  are	  required	  to	  approach	  faulty	  LX	  at	  a	  speed	  allowing	  them	  to	  stop	  
short	  of	  LX	  
–  Rail	  vehicle	  can	  only	  proceed	  if	  safe	  to	  do	  so	  
	  
•  In	  (me	  failure	  occurs	  to	  (me	  level	  crossing	  is	  protected	  for	  correc(ve	  
maintenance	  &	  restored	  to	  nominal	  opera(ng	  state,	  level	  crossing	  users	  are	  
exposed	  to	  failure	  state	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Considera(ons	  in	  Quan(ta(ve	  Human	  
Reliability	  Es(ma(on	  
•  Reliability	  of	  procedure	  to	  stop	  trains	  
–  Reliability	  and	  coverage	  of	  remote	  monitoring	  	  
–  Network	  control	  officer	  becomes	  aware	  of	  failure	  through	  human	  machine	  interface	  
–  Network	  control	  officer	  subsequently	  communicates	  failed	  crossing(s)	  to	  rail	  traffic	  crew	  
–  Rail	  traffic	  crew	  have	  to	  stop	  short	  of	  faulty	  crossing(s)	  
•  Example	  of	  error	  producing	  condi1ons	  that	  can	  affect	  tasks	  in	  procedure	  
–  Alarm	  flooding	  in	  the	  control	  room	  –	  especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  mul(ple	  failures	  
–  Train	  could	  be	  a	  significant	  distance	  from	  faulty	  crossing	  requiring	  use	  of	  long-­‐term	  memory	  
–  Verbal	  communica(on	  used	  to	  communicate	  complex	  informa(on	  (LX	  loca(on,	  etc.)	  
•  Es(ma(on	  of	  human	  reliability	  using	  RSSB	  Railway	  Ac(on	  Reliability	  Assessment	  
Technique	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Fail-­‐safe	  Design	  Principles	  
(background	  for	  HAZARD2)	  
•  Level	  crossing	  warning	  devices	  are	  designed	  with	  fail-­‐safe	  principles	  
•  The	  higher	  the	  level	  of	  safety	  integrity,	  the	  lower	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  
safety-­‐related	  system	  failure	  affec(ng	  the	  safety	  func(on	  or	  its	  ability	  to	  
enter	  a	  pre-­‐defined	  safe	  state	  
•  A	  high	  level	  of	  safety	  integrity	  does	  not	  imply	  a	  high	  level	  of	  reliability	  or	  
availability	  
•  Safe	  failures	  states,	  while	  technically	  safe	  within	  the	  system	  boundary,	  
can	  lead	  to	  the	  system-­‐hazard	  or	  addi(onal	  hazards	  when	  considered	  at	  
the	  larger	  socio-­‐technical	  system	  level	  
–  Verifica(on	  that	  further	  failures	  are	  not	  unacceptable	  to	  safety	  requirements	  
of	  system	  
“Safe”	  (right-­‐side)	  Failures	  
(background	  for	  HAZARD2)	  
•  Safe	  failure	  state	  for	  Australian	  level	  crossings	  
–  NoDonally	  level	  crossing	  system	  is	  locked	  in	  a	  safe	  (restricDve)	  state	  
–  Ac(va(on	  of	  flashing	  lights,	  lowering	  of	  boom	  barriers	  (if	  applicable)	  
–  According	  to	  Queensland	  road	  code:	  
A	  driver	  must	  not	  enter	  a	  level	  crossing	  if—	  
(a)	  warning	  lights	  (for	  example,	  twin	  red	  lights	  or	  rotaDng	  red	  lights)	  are	  operaDng	  or	  warning	  bells	  
are	  ringing;	  or	  
(b)	  a	  gate,	  boom	  or	  barrier	  at	  the	  crossing	  is	  closed	  or	  is	  opening	  or	  closing;	  or	  	  
(c)	  …	  
Maximum	  penalty	  –	  20	  penalty	  units.	  
	  
•  But…	  Is	  it	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  level	  crossing	  users	  will	  wait	  
indefinitely?	  
TSV	  Seminar	  Series	  -­‐	  HF	  in	  Transport	  Safety	  06/02/2014	   14	  
Consider	  HAZARD2	  
•  HAZARD2:	  Level	  crossing	  warning	  device	  leads	  road	  users	  to	  engage	  in	  
risk-­‐taking	  behaviour	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Consider	  HAZARD2	  
•  HAZARD2:	  Level	  crossing	  warning	  device	  leads	  road	  users	  to	  engage	  in	  
risk-­‐taking	  behaviour	  
–  Review:	  recommend	  expansion	  of	  safety	  case	  to	  include	  quan(fica(on	  of	  
HAZARD2	  -­‐	  specify	  THRs	  for	  right-­‐side	  failures	  	  
–  Tradeoff	  between	  safe	  and	  dangerous	  failures	  and	  impact	  on	  reliability	  
	  
























(no warning for 
approaching 
train)
Frequent / prolonged 
exposure to failures leads 











Road	  User	  Performance	  
•  Regular	  user	  may	  encounter	  same	  LX	  several	  (mes	  in	  succession	  for	  
prolonged	  failure;	  on	  occasion	  for	  intermiYent	  failure	  
–  Frequent	  exposure	  to	  failure	  can	  condi(on	  level	  crossing	  user	  to	  loose	  
confidence	  in	  warning	  	  
•  Poten(ally	  affec(ng	  performance	  at	  other	  LXs	  also	  –	  e.g.	  Rungoo	  
–  Performance	  shaping	  factors	  such	  as	  expecta(ons	  of	  when	  trains	  run	  (known	  
schedules)	  can	  cause	  LX	  user	  to	  create	  mental	  models	  for	  when	  warning	  is	  
credible	  
•  Mismatch	  between	  real	  risk	  and	  perceived	  risk	  
–  Failures	  (e.g.	  tail	  ringing)	  where	  device	  appears	  to	  operate	  correctly	  –	  i.e.	  
warning	  ac(vates	  on	  approach	  of	  a	  train	  	  
•  False	  percep(on	  of	  when	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  traverse	  
•  Second	  train	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Road	  User	  Performance	  
•  Studies	  linking	  exposure	  to	  “safe”	  failures	  (false	  
alarms)	  to	  rate	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  
–  Before	  /	  aler	  observa(onal	  study	  19871	  
•  High	  rate	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  observed	  at	  LX	  with	  50%	  false	  
alarms	  compared	  with	  LX	  with	  no	  false	  alarms	  
–  Simulator	  research	  US	  DOT	  FRA	  20072	  
•  Motorists	  were	  sensi(ve	  to	  reliability	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  
comply	  when	  they	  perceived	  warning	  to	  be	  reliable	  
1	  J.	  N.	  Brites,	  M.	  C.	  Hay,	  and	  G.	  J.	  S.	  Wilde,	  "Video-­‐recorded	  Driver	  Behaviour	  at	  Railway	  Crossings:	  Approach	  Speeds	  and	  Cri(cal	  Incidents,"	  
Canadian	  Ins(tute	  of	  Guided	  Ground	  Transport	  Report	  No.	  87-­‐	  7,	  1987.	  
	  
2	  M.	  Gil,	  J.	  Multer,	  and	  M.	  Yeh,	  "Effects	  of	  Ac(ve	  Warning	  Reliability	  on	  Motorist	  Compliance	  at	  Highway-­‐Railroad	  Grade	  Crossings,"	  U.S.	  
Department	  of	  Transporta(on	  Federal	  Railroad	  Administra(on,	  Washington	  DC,	  USA	  DOT/FRA/ORD-­‐09/06,	  2007.	  
Quan(fying	  Road	  User	  Reliability	  
•  Ongoing	  work	  
–  FMECA	  can	  be	  used	  to	  iden(fy	  failure	  modes	  that	  revert	  
to	  a	  “safe”	  failure	  state	  
–  Exis(ng	  literature	  and	  simula(on	  research	  to	  inform	  a	  
model	  for	  road	  user	  reliability	  	  
•  Quan(fica(on	  of	  the	  probability	  that	  frequent	  or	  prolonged	  right-­‐side	  
failure	  results	  in	  the	  road	  user	  traversing	  the	  level	  crossing	  
•  Quan(fica(on	  of	  error	  producing	  condi(ons	  rela(ng	  to	  reliability	  of	  
perceiving	  warning	  and	  traversing	  when	  safe	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Key	  HF	  Considera(ons	  in	  Specifica(on	  
of	  Safety	  Technologies	  
•  Level	  crossings	  are	  part	  of	  a	  complex	  socio-­‐technical	  system	  
–  Interfaces	  with	  technical	  and	  non-­‐technical	  systems	  (e.g.	  level	  crossing	  
users,	  train	  drivers,	  track	  workers,	  etc.)	  
–  Technology	  needs	  to	  be	  designed	  to	  be	  op(mal	  
•  HF	  issues	  considered	  throughout	  safety	  lifecycle	  	  
•  LX	  example:	  reliability	  can	  condi(on	  human	  performance,	  which	  can	  give	  rise	  
to	  other	  hazards	  
•  Challenging	  the	  validity	  of	  assump(ons	  underpinning	  safe	  failure	  
states	  
–  SIL4	  does	  not	  mean	  system	  meets	  safety	  requirements	  
•  Commonly	  misused	  concept	  –	  should	  not	  be	  used	  for	  marke(ng	  /	  described	  as	  
a	  system	  aYribute	  
–  Safety	  jus(fica(on	  needs	  to	  contextualize	  system	  states	  
•  Quan(fica(on	  of	  human	  error	  can	  be	  used	  to	  determine	  
effec(ve	  level	  of	  risk	  reduc(on	  
Conclusion	  
•  Human	  factors	  context	  is	  the	  least	  portable	  
part	  of	  a	  safety	  argument	  	  
– Needs	  to	  be	  considered	  for	  specific	  installa(on,	  
procedural	  and	  opera(onal	  context	  
•  E.g.	  LCLCWDs	  des(ned	  for	  low-­‐popula(on	  /	  low-­‐
exposure	  sites,	  typically	  rural	  areas	  of	  Australia	  with	  
longer	  MTTR	  	  
•  E.g.	  LCLCWDs	  that	  would	  otherwise	  meet	  safety	  
requirements	  one	  context	  may	  not	  meet	  required	  level	  
of	  risk	  reduc(on	  to	  meet	  THRs	  associated	  with	  system-­‐
level	  hazards	  in	  another	  
•  Australasian	  Centre	  for	  Rail	  Innova(on	  
–  Independent	  research	  organiza(on	  
•  Taking	  Rail	  CRC	  research	  program	  forward,	  ensuring	  its	  legacy	  
–  Provides	  (mely	  and	  responsive	  research	  
•  Ability	  to	  get	  research	  done	  in	  shorter	  projects	  as	  well	  as	  longer	  
projects,	  where	  (mely	  input	  to	  business	  case	  or	  policy	  is	  required	  
•  Pool	  funding	  –	  dollar	  mul(plica(on	  effect	  
–  Has	  a	  structured	  full	  program	  of	  work	  
•  e.g.	  level	  crossing	  research	  
–  Consistent	  approach	  
•  Working	  with	  governments	  and	  industry	  to	  have	  a	  consistent	  
approach	  
•  Harmoniza(on	  of	  research	  efforts	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